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ABSTRACT 
In the domain of social protection and social policy, a conventional way of trying to document 
“Europeanization” has always been to track European English policy discourses at the EU level and in the 
nations of Europe. Notions that crystallize the normative orientations promoted in the forums of political 
communication and in the policy communities are numerous. All of them are crafted in English and travel 
across national forums of political communication and national scientific forums. The present paper selects 
two such notions, i.e. “activation” and “flexicurity” and carefully studies the locus of their inventions and the 
travels across many countries and many forums – national and transnational. The precise documentation is 
based on participation in numerous forums, field studies in Denmark, Germany, France, the United Kingdom 
and Italy over a long period (1997-2008). The findings are all relevant for this period, i. e. prior to the 
upheaval of social policies at the EU level and in the member states provoked by the financial and economic 
crisis. They have in common to identify the dissemination of a standard discourse and the resilience of 
national substantive choices and roles of actors of social protection and labour market policies. Because the 
paper is written with hindsight, taking stock of the late 1990s and early 2000s, a de facto comparison 
unexpectedly becomes feasible with the crisis period (2008-2014). The counterfactual is easy to design: a 
powerful Europeanization of systems of social protection and labour markets has happened in this second 
period, via the highly constrained implementation of structural reform and budget cuts programmes deemed 
to satisfy macroeconomic and macrofiscal orientations decided at the EU level, especially within the 
Eurozone, and especially in the Southern member states. Whereas the Europeanization of discourse and 
social policy concepts remained superficial in 1997-2008, actual and hard Europeanization really bit deeply 
since the crisis into national arrangements, even affecting international and European labour law. 
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Activación y flexiguridad. ¿La europeización superficial del empleo? 
 
 
RESUMEN 
En el ámbito de la protección social y de la política social, una forma habitual de intentar ilustrar los 
procesos de “europeización” ha sido la de rastrear los discursos políticos europeos en inglés a nivel de la 
Unión europea y de los estados nacionales.  Son numerosas las nociones que cristalizan en orientaciones 
_____________ 
 
 The paper was first presented at the RC19 meeting, session 5, in the context of the 
2010 Gothenburg International sociological association meeting, on the 13th of July. 
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normativas promovidas en los foros de comunicación política y en las comunidades políticas. Todas ellas 
están diseñadas en inglés y se desplazan a través de foros nacionales de comunicación política y foros 
científicos nacionales. Este artículo selecciona dos de estas nociones, la de activación y flexiguridad y 
analiza cuidadosamente el origen de sus invenciones y de sus viajes a través de muchos países y foros 
nacionales y transnacionales. La documentación específica se basa en la participación en numerosos foros, 
estudios de campo en Dinamarca, Alemania, Francia, Reino Unido e Italia a lo largo de un largo periodo 
(1997-2008). Los resultados son relevantes para este periodo previo al revuelo provocado por la crisis 
económica y financiera, de las políticas sociales de la Unión europea y de los estados miembros. Comparten 
la difusión del discurso estándar y la resiliencia de las elecciones sustantivas nacionales y de los papeles de 
los actores de la protección social y de las políticas del mercado de trabajo. Ya que este artículo está escrito 
en retrospectiva, teniendo en cuenta finales de los noventa y principios del primer decenio del s. XXI, nos 
permite realizar una comparación con el periodo de crisis (2008-2014). El contraste es fácil de diseñar: se ha 
generado una poderosa europeización de los sistemas de protección social y del mercado de trabajo en este 
segundo periodo, a través de la implementación, altamente constrictiva, de reformas estructurales y de 
recortes presupuestarios dirigidos a satisfacer las orientaciones macroeconómicas y macrofiscales impuestas 
por la Unión europea, especialmente en la eurozona, y particularmente para los estados miembros del sur de 
Europa. Mientras que la europeización del discurso y de los conceptos de política social era superficial en el 
primer periodo 1997-2008, la europeización dura actual influye profundamente desde el periodo de crisis en 
los acuerdos nacionales, incluso afectando al derecho del trabajo internacional y europeo.  
 
Palabras clave: Europa social, europeización, política social europea, flexiguridad, activación de la 
protección social. 
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Introduction 
 
At a certain level of abstraction, all things are the same: as the great comparatist 
G. Sartori once wrote, the world will be populated with “vacche grigie” (grey cows) 
(Sartori, 1991a:35). Such an assessment may apply to “welfare” programmes and 
systems, employment contracts, their qualities, and the normative frameworks into 
which they are embedded. These have been increasingly and extensively compared 
across Europe for the last 20 years, especially in the wake of the European 
Employment Strategy since 1997. Functional comparisons abound, that stem from 
very different sources: some academic, with a relative domination of economics, 
some political or administrative. At the same time, European political discourses, 
finely worded in European English, travel all the time transnationally. However, the 
norms of employment, the industrial relations systems by which they are 
_____________ 
 
1 This section of the paper draws on Barbier (2007). 
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determined, as well as the social protection systems they are intrinsically associated 
with, have remained extremely diverse across the countries of Europe.  
In some – for instance in Britain – the very notion of “social partners” has not 
yet been really adopted. Aktivering, the original programme launched in Denmark 
in the early 1990s displayed distinctive features while the international discourse 
was soon talking about “activation”, a very vague notion indeed. Especially from 
2006 to 2007, “flexicurity” was hailed by the EU’s DG Employment, Social 
Affairs and Equal Opportunities: while transnational exchange on the matter was 
very active, real and tough issues were finally collectively addressed within 
national borders. Many other concepts drawn from labour market analysis could 
be taken as further examples of potential Europeanization: for instance, précarité 
de l’emploi (“employment precariousness”) was invented in France back in the 
late 1970’s but, outside the Latin countries of Europe, other countries which did 
not understand the concept have finally been aware of new phenomena 
concerning “atypical” jobs; so-called “make work pay programmes” suddenly 
mushroomed all across Europe in the mid-1990’s, as “work-first” ones. It is 
difficult to know whether all these fuzzy notions have an actual influence on 
developments at the national level. To say the least, the dissemination of an 
international English discourse by European organizations is certainly not enough 
to documenting a common trend of evolution.  
In the present article, we will concentrate on “activation” and “flexicurity” as 
two emblematic examples. These show that Europeanization has not yet bitten 
very deeply into the national systems. However, to understand the superficiality 
of influence, one has to build one’s comparative method carefully, and use in-
depth investigating, including understanding languages other than mainstream 
English. After establishing a common comparative framework, we will first look 
into the history of “activation” to learn whether the concept refers to a truly 
“Europeanized” phenomenon and to what extent it has demonstrated the 
formation of similar systems of social protection. We will then turn to 
investigating the conceptual story of “flexicurity” in order to see whether the 
promotion of the concept at the EU-level, with the help of certain actors in certain 
countries, has resulted or not into the creation of a European hybrid of labour 
market. 
 
 
1. Comparing European labour markets and systems of social protection  
 
For quite a number of reasons, it is interesting to understand whether national 
labour markets and national systems of social protection in Europe are 
increasingly functioning similarly (even sometimes to the point of “converging”) 
or if they keep their initial idiosyncrasies. Actually, they may be transformed 
under influence coming from abroad: one such influence comes from “Europe” 
and leads to “Europeanization” of some sort. Many conceptions of “Europe” and 
“Europeanization” coexist in the literature: one of the most quoted definitions is 
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Radaelli’s, who suggested to focus on the “domestic impact2” of the “EU policy 
process” (Radaelli 2003:30). 
Here, our approach will be different. We shall consider “Europeanization” as 
the process by which national (and local/regional) politics, policies, polities, but 
also political cultures, discourses, ideologies, governance and government 
practices tend to lose their distinct national characteristics to new hybridized 
(=European) equivalents (politics, policies, etc.). This includes the impact of the 
EU policy process but goes beyond. In the domain of labour markets and social 
protection, the process of Europeanization tends to make these similar, resulting 
in the gradual construction of a « Europeanized » new common type. The 
counterfactuals of the new hybrid in construction lie in the existing national 
variety, a variety that has been commonly classified into “welfare”, or “labour 
market” “regimes”, or “varieties” (Esping-Andersen 1990; Hall & Soskice 2001). 
Because cross-influences among countries are enormously pregnant in Europe, 
and not only coming from “the EU policy process”, the assumption can be tested 
according to which these multiple cross-influences are gradually producing a new 
composite breed of policies, practices, values, norms and institutions. If this 
assumption was true, labour markets and systems of social protection would be 
more and more losing their distinctive institutional features acquired in history 
since the late 19th century.  
Documenting such an assumption is a very exacting task, however, for many 
reasons: a comprehensive view of the systems is certainly not acquired easily. As 
is common in social science, one strategy is choosing a certain level on a ladder of 
abstraction (Sartori 1991a; 1991b; 1970). At a certain level of abstraction, 
obviously, all labour markets and systems of social protection in Europe are similar, 
if we compare them, for instance, to the inexistence of modern labour markets and 
social protection systems in Africa. But if we focus on Europe, the problem is 
different: we are bound to hesitate between a “big picture” strategy (aggregation 
strategy), that privileges common features at a very high level of abstraction, and a 
qualitative and precise inquiry into national – or even sub-national – empirical 
realities (specification strategy), which are all differing to a certain extent. Both 
strategies are perfectly acceptable and yield different findings that may not be 
incompatible, on one essential condition. This condition requires that the 
comparative method used in each type of strategy is convincingly argued and that 
one actively avoids the many traps of comparison (Barbier and Letablier 2005), and 
the various mistakes that Sartori identified a long time ago, namely “parochialism”, 
_____________ 
 
2 He defines Europeanization as “Processes of (a) construction, (b) diffusion, and (c) 
institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways 
of doing things’, and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in 
the making of EU public policy and politics and then incorporated in the logic of domestic 
discourse, identities, political structures, and public policies”. 
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“misclassification”, “degreeism”, and “concept stretching”. Nevertheless, with the 
hindsight of an extraordinary quantitative increase of comparative research over the 
last 20 years, especially in the context of more or less generous funding by the 
European Union (Barbier 2005)3, one gains the impression that a great part of this 
comparative research still displays the limits that Sartori identified in his seminal 
contribution about comparative politics (1991a:26)4. 
At the same time, the comparative corpus of literature in sociology and political 
science keeps being enriched by new contributions covering the systematic and in-
depth comparison of many countries (Schmidt 2006; Scharpf & Schmidt 2000; 
Crouch 1999; Goul Andersen et al. 2005, to name but a few, or two-countries 
comparisons, focussed on similar programmes (Knuth and Larsen 2009; Barbier & 
Fargion 2005; Giraud and Lechevalier 2010; van den Berg 2009) or in-depth 
monographs that analyze one country over a certain period, but from a comparative 
angle (Zimmerman 2001; Jørgensen 2002, to name but two). These in-depth 
comparisons share many distinctive features, among which two stand out: they 
combine detailed empirical field work conducted with adequate methods and build 
on an explicit and robust comparative framework. On the opposite, another strand 
of comparative literature in political science and sociology, because it is produced 
in the context of large-scale comparative projects funded by the European 
Commission – an institution that mainly looks for simplified and standardized 
“policy lessons” – and because it is conducted in uncontrolled for inter-disciplinary 
situations, tends to eschew the difficult double task of achieving the construction of 
a consistent comparative research design and of doing consistent and sufficient 
empirical field work.  
As of principle, two main comparative strategies are available in mainstream 
international research situations. The first one, I would call “quick-fix”, combines 
three essential elements: (1) the juxtaposition of national cases into a vague 
comparative framework, where the object of research is defined fuzzily; (2) the use 
of vague concepts, or notions, that are not clearly delineated and separately defined 
from the mainstream political discourse of international organizations (like the 
OECD, the World Bank, and the EU); and (3) last but not least, the uncritical use of 
international English for the half-baked translation of superficial and 
decontextualized descriptive accounts of national phenomena bundled together. The 
consequence of this method is that potential variety cannot be observed, and that 
every national or sub-national object, because of the “surface comparison”, tends to 
_____________ 
 
3 A greater and greater part of research in social sciences now happens in “international 
research situations”, implying the collective work of many researchers assembled for 
answering “policy questions” raised by the European Commission, without little attention to 
the distinct theoretical basis of disciplines.  
4 “il settore ditto “politica comparata” è ormai densamento popolato da studiosi che non 
hanno mai paragonato nulla a nulla, che non hanno nessun interesse a paragonare” (p. 26). 
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fit into a common, artificially produced picture: instead of separating cats and dogs, 
as Sartori wanted us to do, we get “cat-dogs” and even worse, “grey cows”. A 
typical case of such “first aid comparison” is often to be found in the OECD and the 
EU production, or in documents emanating from economic think-tanks. 
Europeanization, in this case, far from being a question to be explored, is rather an 
in-built consequence of the method used. Actually, it might also be sometimes a 
product of normative politics. I showed (Barbier 2006:10-11) for instance that in the 
early 2000s, the OECD, which explicitly fought for the acceptation of so-called 
“make-work pay” programmes by its members, designed studies in order to show 
that countries were already adopting such strategies, which, incidentally, authors 
refrained from defining otherwise as vaguely (Duncan et al. 2003). Self-fulfilling 
prophecy was their strategy. On the opposite, a strategy of in-depth comparison 
(Barbier 2005) entails (1) the construction of a consistent comparative framework 
of labour markets and systems of social protection; (2) the use of analytical 
concepts, strictly defined vis-à-vis political notions, and (3) the careful 
understanding and consideration of categories expressed in their original language, 
before being potentially translated, if it is possible, or if not, explained in context. 
Of course, intermediate strategies of comparison exist, where competing 
explanations oppose different scholars, among whom discussion is possible. For 
instance, a rich strand of such literature is published, that concentrate mainly on the 
identification of broad common trends: its findings may always be challenged 
inasmuch as its methods leave detailed documentation of  specific traits in countries 
outside their scope. Sometimes, research is openly biased because it starts from the 
point of view that one system – the researcher’s system – is the template, the model 
or even the future, for every possible system: a case in point here is N. Gilbert’s 
universalistic stance, when he contended that, because of “the triumph of 
capitalism”, a general movement was “evident” towards what he termed (2002:5) 
“work-oriented policies, privatization of social welfare, increased targeting of 
benefits and the shift from an emphasis on the social rights of citizenship to the 
civic duties of community members”. In a book the same author edited, Barbier and 
Théret (2003) demonstrated that it was not the case, at least for France. On a more 
specific level, the seminal work published by Lødemel and Trickey (2000) 
addressing a question that would later fall under the common label of “activation”, 
addressed a phenomenon inadequately defined as “workfare”, abstaining from 
constructing of a comparative concept5. The literature on “dualization” is similar in 
this respect, inasmuch as it systematically endeavours to find “dualism” (with a 
rather elastic definition and an uncertain situation in history) in what it calls 
“Bismarckian” countries with simplified features (Palier & Thelen 2010; Clegg 
2007). Our intention is not to discuss this literature comprehensively but to show, 
_____________ 
 
5  They defined what they called “workfare” in minimalist terms (“programmes and 
schemes that require people to work in return for social assistance” (2000:6). 
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on two examples, that the use of notions and concepts that are apparently 
comparative may be very misleading and deceptive, because too superficial findings 
are collected with their help. To be more explicit, we contend that the scientific 
answer to the question whether all European countries are “Europeanized” because 
they make some use of “activation” (as the common parlance goes), or whether they 
are “Europeanized” because they implement some form of “flexicurity”, will never 
be really found, because both concepts are inconsistent and vague. 
As many others –the notion of “make work pay” just quoted, for instance – both 
“activation” and “flexicurity” have common characteristics: (1) they were initially 
coined (when not explicitly commissioned6) by politicians in a specific situation, 
which is generally identifiable, at a certain point in time and in a certain language 
which was not always English; quite often, social scientists and academics helped in 
the process and this is one of the reasons why the concepts created subsequently 
travelled to the academic field; (2) because of the prevailing “international research 
situations”, the word in question then spread to a wider, international academic 
community, and international organizations were very active at disseminating these 
concepts; by the same token, the concepts generally took on board a definite 
normative content; the distinction between political strategies and analytical tools 
then became inevitably blurred. In the process, analytical precision was lost and it 
was impossible to identify whether national situations (labour markets, systems of 
social protection) change and to what degree, because, from the start, it was 
postulated that their institutions and practices did fit into the new categories created 
(Barbier 2014). 
Hence, to understand whether the systems of social protection are now 
“activated”, and to what extent this alleged “activation” makes sense in sociological 
terms, one has to build analytical tools and to distance oneself from the prevailing 
administrative and political discourse: in the process, one finds that, beyond the 
inevitably loosely defined meaning of political notions, it might be possible to 
ascribe sound analytical substance to well-defined concepts. This is what we did for 
the notion of “activation of social protection” (Barbier 2002; 2003; 2004b; 2008b), 
an analysis that we will allude to in the following section. Similarly, far from 
restricting ourselves to a close comment of the political declarations and analyses 
produced by the European Commission, for instance, in the case of “flexicurity”, 
we will show, with more detail, that the concept is, in sociological terms, essentially 
inconsistent, and has purely remained at the level of rhetoric. Incidentally, this 
certainly did not prevent its extensive and practical use by a great variety of actors. 
In both cases, we will try and follow similar steps: the first leads to identifying 
where the concept was born and its initial conditions of meaning, always historically 
_____________ 
 
6 It was the case for instance for R. Nixon who asked the journalist William Safire to 
coin a new term for depreciating American assistance (the AFDC programme), and Safire 
came with the extraordinarily successful term “workfare” (Barbier 2007). 
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and geographically situated, in a specific context and generally one particular political 
culture. At a second stage, identifiable actors with their own agenda use and 
disseminate the notion in certain countries. Finally, during the transnational social 
process of construction, notions tend to be considered as concepts with actual flesh 
and become universally known by specialized academics and internationalized 
politicians; at this stage, they become catchwords. It is then possible that politicians 
and some academics conclude, bona fide, that countries of Europe are 
“Europeanized” through these trends. Even, some think that they become gradually 
homogenized, and the eventual strategy of “activation” is seen as a European 
hybridization of all similar efforts undertaken, here and there, in Germany, France 
and Denmark for that matter. Similarly, the “Europeanization” of labour markets and 
social protection systems is often inferred, by the same persons, from superficial 
comparison and the conclusions of “flexicurity studies” (most often than not 
commissioned by the European Commission): elements of “flexicurity” are deemed 
to be present here and there, in the United Kingdom and Poland, or Rumania for that 
matter. Although it is not possible within the space devoted to this paper to 
substantiate our claim in comprehensive empirical detail, our contention is exactly at 
the opposite: whereas, using a precise comparative research design leads to 
identifying clear common trends (a surface form of “Europeanization”), the main 
conclusion of in-depth empirical inquiries (conducted for the last 20 years, Barbier 
2008a; 2008b) shows that national markets and national systems keep their specific 
traits and resist more profound “Europeanization”. One of the reasons for this 
resilience of things national, typically well exemplified in the so-called “Greek crisis” 
at the beginning of 2010, has been and will be, for the known future, the presence of 
deeply embedded political cultures, a point that we have studied elsewhere (Barbier 
2008a). Suffice it to say here that the main political compromises and decisions about 
“activation” and “flexicurity” have been, and will be made and taken at the national 
level, just for want of an alternative other credible level where to make them. 
 
 
2. The “activation” of what? 
 
The fame of what was going to be labelled “activation” (with no other 
complement, and an implicitly metonymical usage) started in Denmark in 1992, 
under the label of aktivering, the Danish equivalent of “activating” (from the verb 
aktivere). This referred to programmes introduced for the young people by the Social 
Democrat government. Because the programmes appeared to be very effective, the 
success was noticed by many quarters, especially by the OECD, happy to disseminate 
the good news in their publications, as a “best practice”. Gradually the phrase came to 
be used across Europe by academics and politicians, although rarely before the 
general public. The smallest common denominator for its substance was the 
contention that it was fair and efficient to impose new obligations to the unemployed 
and the assisted persons. A veritable industry of “activation” studies then flourished 
and rather quickly replaced the emerging comparative research focussed on 
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“workfare”. Yet, “activation” was unfortunately often not more precisely defined than 
“workfare”: it was cut from its precise historical and contextual roots, and applied 
loosely to every form of employment and unemployment reforms. Nevertheless, as 
we will see, it was possible to use the concept of “activation of social protection” (and 
not the catchword “activation” only) to show that the transformation systems were 
submitted to had an economic rationale, and certainly did not limit to the mere 
imposition – most often than not seen as “punitive” – of obligations upon the 
unemployed, and an alleged “re-commodification” of “welfare”. Using Pierson’s 
categories of “welfare state restructuring” (2001), the new trend of “activation of 
social protection” took many forms, so that the Europeanization it brought with it 
remained limited to a general, functional, trend. 
 
Origins: immediate source  
 
It is true that aktivering had a close predecessor in Norway, under another label: 
in this country, arbejdslinjen (the work rule or line) was advocated in important 
reform documents in 1992. The meaning was slightly different, implying 
nevertheless the same content as existed in Danish aktivering for the young. Priority 
was to be given to find work for the assisted persons (Dahl and Drøpping 2001: 270; 
Hvinden 1999). At about the same time, a Danish scholar analyzed the emerging 
reform in terms of Danish “workfare” (Torfing 1999) and he showed that the latter 
was quite different from the American: while Danish ‘aktivering’ programmes did 
fit well with the tradition of an overall high level of labour market participation 
(especially for women), they introduced a real turn in Danish policy, because they 
reduced the length of access to benefits and imposed work requirements in a 
country where a quasi-unconditional basic income existed at the time. This did not 
however amount to adopting a “supply side”-oriented OECD doctrine, nor to the 
reduction of unemployment benefits to low flat-rate levels as in the UK (Jørgensen 
2002). Later the programmes were extended to the entire population of the 
unemployed and, in 1998, to the persons eligible to assistance in the communes. 
 
Internationalization begins and the word is spread all around 
 
The internationalization of “activation” came later, in two parallel steps, through 
the combined influence of the OECD and the European Commission, both 
organizations, by the way, being in constant rivalry at the time, just before the 
European Employment Strategy (EES) eventually completed its preparations 
(Barbier 2004a). After the publication of the 1994 OECD “Jobs Study”, in the 
subsequent yearly Employment Outlook reports, OECD experts kept praising labour 
market reforms which decreased eligibility and coverage of unemployment 
insurance or assistance. They particularly praised the Danish introduction of an 
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“individual handlingsplan” (“action plan”) in its early labour market reform7, to 
“activate” the unemployed (Jørgensen 2002). Actually the Danish example of 
aktivering was used abroad to exemplify a virtuous type of reform, and a departure 
from presumed old style “passive” policies. The subject thus entered national 
debates in many countries that were contemplating some form of reform of 
unemployment insurance. Moreover, from 1994, a key OECD benchmark was the 
“activation of labour market policies”, in the wider context of structural labour 
market reforms and the connected idea of “welfare reform”. At the time, the OECD 
sharply criticised policies in countries like France and the Latin countries. There 
was also a constant contrasting of the allegedly high performance of the USA’s 
labour market with supposedly poor outcomes in continental countries. 
At the very same time, with the important influence of Allan Larsson, a former 
Swedish minister (Barbier 2004a), the European Commission was busy preparing 
the launch of an innovative initiative that would become the EES in 1997. At the 
time, the word “activation” was not yet used widely as it is now, without any 
complement. It was rather linked to the Swedish legacy of “active labour market 
policies” (see next section). This goal featured high on the European Union’s 
agenda, more visibly from the Essen summit (1994) onwards, but the 1993 White 
Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment also contained explicit 
recommendations for the activation of labour market policies (ALMPs)8. It is only 
later that the notion of “activation” found its place, with the help of the Danish 
legacy, and, at the same time, leading to a significant substitution for the notion of 
ALMPs. Meanings of “activation” and “active” were not fixed, but travelled, as 
ministers and officials were busy coining messages they definitely wanted to be 
new and innovative. 
 
The European Employment Strategy 
 
At the European Council in Essen in 1994, where a precursor of the EES was 
agreed, “activation” and “active measures” were among the priorities adopted. They 
were introduced in the first version of the EES with its four pillars agreed at the 
Luxembourg summit of 1997, particularly in the first one (“increasing 
employability”). But gradually the notion (added in 1999) that the “tax and benefit 
systems” had to be reformed in order to increase employment and incentives to take 
jobs, featured more and more prominently on the agenda (Barbier 2004a). It was 
another form of “activation”, as we will see, because the goal was to increase labour 
market participation and to foster the creation of more jobs. Finally, “activation” 
_____________ 
 
7 See for instance the report of the reform in the 1995 edition of Employment Outlook (p.125, 
French edition). The 1995 OECD report on the implementation of the Jobs Strategy also 
mentioned the introduction of individual plans in Denmark as a progress (p. 32, French edition). 
8 So-called “passive policies” were also sharply criticized in the 1993 EU White Paper. 
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became both a dimension of the EU economic recommendations (the Broad 
Economic Policy Guidelines – the BEPG) and of the EES Guidelines. It was 
deemed to apply to individuals in the working age population, whether they were 
active or inactive (for instance the disabled); it applied to women and lone parents, 
to the ‘socially excluded’ persons, but also to early retirees and to pensioners. The 
mainstream recommendation was for policies fostering the overall increase of 
employment rates, with specific targets for older people and women. But 
“activation” also applied, if less directly, to benefit programmes, to policies, to the 
whole array of instruments described as “tax and benefits” systems. In the policy 
orthodoxy, not only individuals were to be “activated”, but also systems deemed too 
“passive” and inefficient, particularly adverse to job creation and to labour market 
flexibility. This was the general message and it has been with us till today, in 2014. 
Indicators were devised to calculate “rates of activation”. Ironically, Denmark, the 
very nation where aktivering was invented, had difficulties to appear as having the 
“best” activation rates in the “benchmarking exercise” organized by the European 
Commission. 
 By then, the initial meaning and context of aktivering was lost, and academics 
kept adding new interpretations, divided between those who were strongly against 
“activation” and “workfare” (Wacquant 1999) and those in favour of it (Gilbert 
2000), mostly for ideological reasons; multiple meanings were discussed (Serrano 
2007). The notion became increasingly used (Gilbert and Van Voorhis 2001; 
Esping Andersen et al. 2001; Goul Andersen et al. 2005). It essentially focused on 
programmes aiming at transferring “welfare” recipients to the labour market 
(“welfare-to-work strategies”). And this is probably the mainstream meaning the 
concept has now taken on board, as “activation” as such, without complements, is 
the codeword for making benefit recipients work, more or less forcefully. In 2002, 
van Berkel and Møller showed that these programmes could be normatively 
justified in many ways (2002: 51-56). The mechanisms anticipated and their 
normative justifications were in fact all but homogeneous, ranging from the 
traditional American conservative approach of “rights and responsibilities” aimed at 
fighting “welfare dependency”, to the unconditional and universal access in 
Scandinavian “activation programmes”. Despite these efforts to take distance from 
a rather restricted meaning, as well as interpretation of the reform as a much wider 
“activation of social protection” (Barbier 2002; 2004b), the restricted meaning has 
prevailed, simplified for instance by scholars adopting a German perspective after 
the Hartz reform: “the core element of activation is the removal of options for 
labour market exit and unconditional benefit receipt by members of the working-
age population” (Eichhorst et al. 2008:5). 
 
A broader perspective is needed 
 
If one took for granted, as many scholars unfortunately did, that the truth about 
“activation” lay in Eichhorst’s definition, a great part of the current restructuring of 
social protection, if not the essential part, would be lost to analysis. The reforms 
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studied from the early 1990s, those starting in Denmark and Norway, had first to be 
placed in a historical perspective. “Activation” was not suddenly and utterly new. 
Secondly, “activation” had to be explained in political economy terms, and had to 
be seen as one of many reforms affecting the wider spectrum of social protection 
programmes. If one did so, new insights were to come to the front, and, taking 
distance with the mainstream international fascination of “rights and obligations”, 
the question whether “activation” was a form of Europeanization of systems of 
social protection could be solved empirically. 
Building a comprehensive comparative framework either to compare a great 
number of countries, or to make in-depth comparison of two cases (Barbier and 
Fargion 2004; Barbier and Knuth 2010), one learnt essential elements that remained 
lost to those scholars that were focussing on the introduction of welfare-to-work as 
a supposed return to the old spirit of the workhouse. Indeed, a first element to take 
on board was that “activation” was not entirely new. The essential link of social 
protection systems to the labour market should never have been forgotten, as Kvist 
(2002) rightly remarked: even in very “de-commodified” systems, commodification 
was high. Hence, it was besides the point to analyze only “activation” as a “re-
commodification” mechanism. “Activation” had certainly been the order of the day 
all along, in unemployment insurance and assistance, except for certain categories 
of persons. When history was taken into account in the comparative framework, one 
had to recall that the invention of “active labour market policies” was a key element 
that neither appeared in Norway nor with the Danish aktivering programmes for the 
young in 1992. Very simply, three important stages can be identified in this respect. 
The first is related to the historical “Swedish model”, as far back as the 40s. The 
model was gradually implemented in the 50s and 60s and reached full gear in the 
70s – although with features which did not exactly fit the ideas of its inventors, G. 
Rehn and R. Meidner. With a prudent fiscal policy and selective expansionary 
instruments (to contain inflation - different in this respect from mainstream 
Keynesianism) the model combined a centrally bargained and solidaristic wage 
policy with active labour market policies. There, activation referred mainly to the 
necessity of tackling labour market adjustment problems through a variety of 
programmes fostering mobility, reallocation of the workforce, training, etc. 
“Activation” in this sense was aimed at increasing the flexibility of the labour 
market in a safe and egalitarian environment for workers. The stress was on 
activation of the market and of policy, which was normatively preferred to the 
traditional provision of unemployment compensation (Milner and Wadensjö 2001; 
Van den Berg 2009). A high level of public employment was also a distinctive 
feature of the “model” (including extensive temporary public employment). The 
“model” eventually was completely transformed, although it actually retained its 
ALMP element, a Swedish tradition later extended to other Nordic countries. At a 
second stage, in 1964, the OECD adopted a recommendation to promote an “active 
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labour market policy”9, in a period where Keynesianism was still the mainstream 
economic policy reference. At the time, the OECD assessed the combination of 
policies implemented in Sweden positively. It is only after the neo-liberal turn, in a 
third stage during the 1980s, in the context of increasing separation of macro-
economic and social policies, that the notion of ALMPs took on its present content, 
i.e. the focussing on structural and supply-side labour market reforms. OECD 
reports have consolidated and emphasised this notion, while particularly criticising 
member states with a high commitment to what they labelled “passive policies”, 
(chiefly unemployment compensation and early retirement programmes). The 
contemporary meaning of “activation” (without complement) was, implicitly, 
grafted on the legacy of ALMPs, and with the political claim that entirely new 
mechanisms were invented in the 1990s, an empirically flawed claim indeed. 
Broadening the historical perspective, and accepting to look earlier than the 
1992 introduction of aktivering also led to remark that back in 1988, both the 
Family Act in the United States and the Revenu minimum d’insertion (RMI) Act in 
France, made contributions to the rationale of “activation”, but very differently: the 
first promoted the development of welfare-to work, i. e. in American terms of the 
time, “workfare”, while the second, on that same year, promoted “Republican” 
insertion (integration in society) (Barbier and Théret 2003). New French policies, 
which started from the introduction of schemes for the disabled in 1975, were 
widely extended afterwards, and were based on a rationale akin to Scandinavian 
inspiration, but with a distinct Republican solidaristic flavour. They had their 
originality: “social integration” was not meant primarily or solely in terms of 
constraining people to take jobs on the market. This amounted to a very different 
brand of “activation” indeed. If one wants to understand what the “activation 
reforms” are today, this historical legacy, here just hinted at, should definitely be 
taken into account. Moreover, “activation reforms” never happened by chance 
because, from the start, an economic rationale underpinned them in a wider macro-
economic context. It is true that “activation” took on a new aspect and scope once 
the ‘Fordist’ regime compromises proved inefficient in the late 1970s and full 
employment policies were discarded. The new requirements for flexibility of work, 
as well as the change of paradigm in economic policy imposed new constraints 
upon national systems, now increasingly exposed to the impact of international 
monetary rules (Barbier and Nadel 2000). National actors (the state, social partners, 
‘civil society’) involved in the design and management of social protection systems 
actively addressed this challenge: this resulted in the diverse re-design of these 
systems within a common thrust. The eventual compromises reached during the 
reform of social protection were certainly not exempt from contradictions of interest 
_____________ 
 
9 « Recommandation du Conseil sur la politique de la main d’œuvre, instrument de la 
croissance économique ». It is no coincidence that Gøsta Rehn was head of the Employment 
and social affairs secretariat at the OECD from 1962 to 1973. 
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and power struggles, which could be very sharp and explode into wide-scale social 
protest, as was shown in recent years10. 
 
An analytical concept: activation with complements 
 
So far, we have essentially used the term “activation” in inverted commas 
systematically, to point to the mainstream expression it takes in the literature, and to 
refer, at the same time, to the political image that captures the minds of actors. 
However, in sociological terms, the term is entirely devoid of any meaning if one 
does not say what or who is or should be activated. Secondly, the word is a typical 
piece of jargon: it has been used only by experts and politicians, especially in an 
international comparison context (in a tremendously heterogeneous way). Empirical 
investigations show, for instance, that local actors only use the term when their 
programmes are explicitly labelled in such a way (a case in point was aktivering in 
Danish). To take only the examples of France and Germany (Barbier and Knuth 
2010), after more than 20 years of “activation strategies” in France, the word is 
practically not used by local actors and practitioners, who still prefer “insertion”. In 
Germany, the term recurring in legal texts is “Eingliederung” (integration, 
incorporation [into employment]); “Aktivierung” as a term has also entered legal 
vocabulary, with the idea of the “client’s obligation of active co-operation“11 but 
“activation” is not used for naming programmes by officials. Beyond the rhetoric of 
political/administrative discourses, the ambiguity of terms does not however 
prevent the fact that one of the main reforms of national social protection systems in 
the last twenty years has certainly been the gradual introduction of “activation of 
social protection” across an increasing number of policy fields in Europe (pensions, 
unemployment insurance, social assistance, family benefits, etc.). To understand 
this, we need an actual comparative concept, one that is not limited by the meaning 
used by politicians, i.e. the ideologically-laden view that unemployed people should 
be more active.  “Activating people” in all sorts of individual ways has certainly 
meant encouraging – and sometimes constraining them – to work more or to engage 
in various sorts of work-related activities, but this was never the only pertinent 
aspect of reform strategies. At the same time, when researchers only focussed on 
this part of the reforms, they forgot that all sorts of complementary reforms were 
happening, and that a wider understanding should be achieved.  
What is “activation of social protection” in analytical terms?: it is a tendency, 
one among many dimensions of the restructuring affecting all systems, with varying 
incidence according to countries, to groups of countries or ‘welfare regimes’, but 
_____________ 
 
10 In 2001-2002, see for instance the mass refusal of the unemployment reform in Spain, 
the PARE controversy in France, the strikes in Italy.  
11 See: „Der erwerbsfähige Hilfebedürftige muss aktiv an allen Maßnahmen zu seiner 
Eingliederung in Arbeit mitwirken“ – § 2 SGB II. 
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also to specific areas of social protection. A macro-concept of “activation of social 
protection” is apt at bundling together a considerable array of reforms which have a 
clear feature in common, i.e. the introduction (or the re-activation/reinforcement) of 
an explicit linking between access to social protection and labour market 
participation (activité professionnelle,  Erwerbsfähigkeit). For the last decade, this 
dynamics has implied the redesigning of previous income support, of assistance, but 
also the transformation of “tax and benefit” policies, that authorities wanted to 
make more “employment-friendly”. Many studies have tried to capture stylised 
versions of “activation”, under the form of ideal-types: most contrast a “liberal” 
type with a “universalistic”, “generous”, “social-democratic”, “social-activation” 
one (Lødemel 2004). I have shown elsewhere in more detail that this entailed the 
construction of ideal types of “activation of social protection”: two, of 
“Beveridgean” style, were rather easy to design; however, a “Bismarckian” ideal-
type was always difficult to construct (Barbier 2002; 2004b; 2008b). Nevertheless, 
in France and Germany, reforms have also happened; as in other countries, de-
specialization of programmes (and policies) is an empirically documented fact12, 
when one compares the strict ‘sectoral’ specialization of the 60’s with the situation 
today. Reform is, in this conception, a trend applying to the entire social protection 
(or welfare) systems, a reform trend similar to those P. Pierson (2001) documented 
under the labels of cost-containment, recalibration and re-commodification. For us, 
this trend of reform, contrary to an analysis where it is posited besides cost-
containment, recalibration and re-commodification (Clegg 2007:600-601), is part of 
these larger trends, and can take various forms in different countries. Such diversity 
is empirically shown with the precise comparison of the reform strategies 
implemented in France and Germany (Barbier and Knuth 2010); not to mention 
earlier research showing that both countries, and social insurance countries more 
generally, harboured institutions and an institutional history that were alien to the 
mere principle of “activation of social protection”, while it was rather easily 
implemented in countries as different as the United Kingdom and Denmark (Clasen 
and Clegg 2006). Because of persistently different empirical hard facts though, it 
would be far-fetched to speak of tendencies supposedly common to “Bismarckian” 
countries13 including the Netherlands and Belgium (Clegg 2007). 
_____________ 
 
12 Interestingly one can note, in passing, that the processes of the Open methods of 
coordination (OMCs) at the EU level contributed to this de-specialization, because they 
have influenced the intellectual framing of policies, their cognitive base. Of this 
phenomenon, many empirical facts testify. The very fact that the European Employment 
strategy was always supposed to coordinate “employment policies” is one of them. 
Interestingly, the Treaty of Lisbon in German hesitates between Beschäftigungs- and 
Arbeitsmarktpolitik (articles 145 and following). 
13 ‘Bismarckianism’ in the sense we use here means four institutional features that have 
cultural counterparts (Barbier 2008a) (eligible persons are wage-earners with their families; 
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The activation of social protection and Europeanization 
 
Finally, in the passage from the introduction of a new political notion in 1992 in 
Denmark to its subsequent extensive use, what one learned was that there was more 
to “activation” than simply reinforcing the obligations of the unemployed and the 
assisted. A much wider stake and greater challenges for reformers have been 
present. It should then come as no surprise that the objectification of a common 
trend, “activation of social protection” (and not “activation” tout-court) takes many 
empirical forms. Even with the short-sighted meaning of “activation” as the 
imposition of new obligations on the unemployed and the assisted, realizations here 
and there vary widely. As a consequence, we can state that the Europeanization of 
national systems of Europe has remained, in a way, on the surface. True, Europeans, 
and most of all Europeanized elites in Brussels’ arenas and forums, have invented a 
common (European English) vocabulary to talk about reforms happening in their 
countries; however the actual reforms have remained shaped by the traditional 
explaining variables of diversity used in the literature: institutions, the role of 
powerful actors, political cultures, and history – sometimes envisaged as path-
dependency. Unlike in conventional ‘sweeping’ comparisons (which tend to sweep 
out national idiosyncrasies), we have to pay due attention to empirical 
developments, rather than making them synonymous by translation14. 
 
 
 
_____________ 
 
social insurance principle with funding by social contributions; benefits proportional to 
incomes; social insurance funds are managed by social partners). While we share the overall 
judgement that France and Germany are clearly comparable, with regard to their common 
principles, and, what’s more, to some common elements in their political cultures, we are 
very cautious in the use of such overall qualifiers. From the beginning, the German system 
was never Bismarckian, in the sense that Bismarck’s political goals were not accepted. From 
its beginning, and despite cross-research and cross-travelling by elites between France and 
Germany, the French system was both influenced by Britain and Germany, their 
predecessors; Bismarck came to France to study existing private pensions; Beveridge 
travelled to Germany; P. Laroque took inspiration in both countries for his post-Second war 
project (Barbier 2008a). The classic reference to principles of ‘Bismarckianism’ should be 
taken with a pinch of salt, because both countries, rather earlier than in other ones, have 
displayed the signs of being hybrids. 
14 Writing in English rather than in either of the national languages concerned helps 
doing so – as long as one defies the temptation to submerge differences in the Eurospeak 
dialect. 
Jean-Claude Barbier                                                     Aktivering, flexicurity, the surface Europenaization… 
 
Cuadernos de Relaciones Laborales  
Vol. 33, Núm. 2 (2015) 357-395 
373 
3. “Flexicurity”: “wish list” or concept able to catch Europeanization fea-
tures15? 
 
The expression “flexicurity” was used from the mid-90s to describe the outcome 
of a negotiated reform in the Netherlands. Wilthagen (1998) was the first to tell this 
story in detail 16 . The same author later noted: “the concept of flexicurity is 
increasingly being taken up in other countries” (Wilthagen and Tros 2003: 12). 
Indeed, towards the late 90s, the term was used by diverse actors (especially Danish 
scholars and, later, politicians) to describe the Danish situation. It is certainly 
through the example of what has often been called the “Danish model” in the media 
that “flexicurity” crossed the boundaries of social policy and labour market forums 
and networks, from the early years 2000 (Barbier, Colomb and Madsen, 2009). The 
OECD explicitly concurred in that result, along with the European Commission 
(Barbier 2014). With the 2008 crisis, the fate of “flexicurity” came very much in 
jeopardy: this was all the truer than a new Commission with a new agenda was put 
in place in 2010, on which “social” questions were definitely sidelined. 
 
Dutch origins: politicians working with advisers 
 
An important Dutch law, enforced from the beginning of 1999, was precisely 
termed: Wet Flexibiliteit en Zekerheid (Flexibility and Security Act). It profoundly 
reformed part-time work, agency work and their associated social protection in this 
country. Wilthagen (1998) has attributed the invention of the term in the Dutch 
context to a senior sociologist and policy adviser of the then government 17 . 
Wilthagen and his colleagues were among the main actors to contribute to the 
confirmation of the word as a common notion in the Dutch policy forums. In a later 
formulation, the same author defined “flexicurity” as a “nexus” (Wilthagen 2002: 
29) but it was not clear what a nexus exactly was for him, which he compared to 
“the labour-capital nexus”. Later, with his colleague Tros (Wilthagen and Tros 2003: 
4) they presented “flexicurity” as a “policy strategy”. The Dutch reforms they 
reviewed were identified as starting from 1995, explicitly under the banner of 
flexibility and security – where a ministerial memorandum was issued under the 
very label under the rule of the Labour Party. But Wilthagen showed that this had 
older roots in the past negotiation between government and social partners, in a 
_____________ 
 
15 This section of the paper draws on Barbier (2007). 
16 He was later nominated as a member of the “Expert group on flexicurity” by the DG 
Employment and Social Affairs, along with six other experts. 
17 Hans Adriaansens was an adviser to the socialist Ad Melkert. They were inspired by a 
report published in 1990, which was exploring ways of increasing labour market 
participation (report by the WRR – Dutch Scientific Advisory Council for the Government – 
Een werkend perspectief, arbeidspaticipatie in de jaren ‘90). 
Jean-Claude Barbier                                                     Aktivering, flexicurity, the surface Europenaization… 
 
Cuadernos de Relaciones Laborales 
Vol. 33, Núm. 2 (2015) 357-395 
374
particular form of what he termed the Dutch “corporatist system”. In a way 
“flexicurity” emerged as an “unanticipated process” (1998: 10) of the actions and 
initiatives of the Dutch government and social partners. Given this empirical review 
and other research (see for instance, Van Oorschot 2001), the reforms that can be 
grouped under a strategy of “flexicurity” in the Netherlands pertain to a long-term 
process of reducing the inequalities of social protection rights in the 90s between 
“atypical” and “regular” employees. During this process, the regulation of fixed-
term and temporary agency work was reformed, leading to fostering enhanced 
access to open-ended contracts; the dismissal procedures were also reviewed during 
the period (Wilthagen 2002: 14). 
Flexicurity travels to Denmark18 
 
Doing in-depth comparative research in Denmark (Barbier 2006), we tried to 
identify the essential steps of the dissemination of the idea and the formulation of 
“flexicurity”, in the administrative and political forums on the one hand and in the 
academic ones on the other. The first formulation of what was later to be called 
“flexicurity” in this country is linked to the designing of a “golden triangle” by 
officials in the ministry of employment (Jørgensen et Pedersen 200419). As Per K. 
Madsen has observed, they first popularised the chart in a report published by the 
ministry in 199920, though they did not mention “flexicurity” at the time. Moreover, 
they insisted  that the virtuous combination of the relationships (between labour 
legislation, unemployment insurance, employment creation and active labour 
market policies) that they combined in their ”triangle” were linked to a specific 
Danish social context (id.:93-9421). The now famous triangle eventually found its 
way into the 2004 issue of  OECD’s Employment Outlook (page 97).  
At about the same time, researchers and academics (especially Danes, but not 
only) were beginning to use the term “flexicurity” to describe the Danish system. 
Per Kongshøj Madsen was the first to make a consistent reference to it from 1999, 
but, he only explicitly used the term ‘flexicurity’ for describing the ‘Danish model’ 
_____________ 
 
18  For the reconstruction of this short story, I am heavily indebted to the people I 
interviewed and who were as kind as indicating me sources in Danish, which they 
sometimes helped me translating, when my rudimentary Danish was insufficient. Prominent 
among them are my colleagues of Carma, the University of Aalborg. Thanking them warmly, 
I am aware that I will have to account for my own mistakes in the eventual interpretation I 
give here.  
19 The 2004 edition I quote is the 7th edition of the well-known textbook in Denmark. 
20 « Arbejdsreformerne – en status », 1999, København (Arbejdsministeriet).  
21 “Særligt ved sammenligning med continental-europæiske lande og de øvrige nordiske 
lande et det nærliggende at undestrege sammenhængen mellem ansættelsesforhold og 
indretningen af dagpengesystemet og aktiveringsindsatsen i Danmark”. 
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from 200322. P.K. Madsen provided a list of specific characteristics pertaining to 
this “model” (2003: 4-5) : a flexible labour market with a high level of external 
flexibility that is permitted by a low level of employment protection; a generous 
income replacement for the unemployed; and active labour market policies that 
allow for enhancing training and qualifications. Later (Madsen 2006: 349-352), in 
his list of features for the Danish “flexicurity” system, he distinguished between 
“basic traits” and “specific developments in the 1990s”, implying that some long-
term features had been playing a role in the present situation. Moreover, adding that 
the “macroeconomic environment” played a role, he also included an item termed 
“political environment” that encompassed not only the role of social partners, 
corporatist structures (“small-state democratic corporatism”) and political support 
in society for reforms. He described an “implicit social contract concerning balance 
between flexibility and security”. Other analyses converged and attributed to 
“flexicurity” an even more encompassing meaning: it seems that for some Danish 
researchers, “flexicurity” could mean a global social consensus that encompassed 
extremely comprehensive, complex and far-reaching dimensions because it had 
lasted for the last 75 years (Kristensen 2006: 300) or because it was intimately 
linked to the nature of the Danish legal system (Rasmussen 2006: 242-243). Danish 
politicians also claimed the term as their own. The former Social Democrat Prime 
Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen commented about the policies he himself 
implemented (1993-2001), as an instance of the realisation of “flexicurity”, in the 
following terms: « the combination of flexible labour markets and individual social 
security – of the Northern countries is [..] based on a) strong social security and 
broad welfare provisions ; b) active labour market and educational policies ; and c) 
a highly mobile labour market, where the social partners (trade unions and 
employers’ associations) are key actors with a high degree of responsibility for 
competitiveness and social sustainability» (2005: 51). It should be noted that his 
description precisely did not limit itself to presenting a mechanism, because he 
stressed the role of actors and their “high degree of responsibility”. Anders Fogh 
Rasmussen, the following conservative Prime minister, for his part, implied, but 
only in front of domestic audiences, that he was the inventor of the term23. From 
what we learned, the claim was certainly far-fetched.  
_____________ 
 
22  Madsen quoted the « golden triangle » from the 1999 Danish report (Madsen 2003: 
101) when he contributed to an ILO comparative study. 
23 He did it on the 21st of November, 2004, at his party’s congress, pretending that he 
innovated in putting both terms together. ”Vi havde EU topmøde forleden. Der havde jeg 
lejlighed til at  fortælle lidt om det. Den drøftelse forgik jo på engelsk. Jeg  kombinerede de 
to ord og sagde, at vi har ’flexibility’ og  ’security’, og så kaldte jeg den danske model for 
"flexicurity". Det er godt, for på fransk hedder det ’flexicurité’”. [the other day, we had a 
European summit. There I had the opportunity to tell a little about it. The discussion was 
held in English. I combined the two words and said that we have “flexibility” and “security”, 
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Anything to compare between the Netherlands and Denmark? 
 
Following G. Sartori’s lesson, after this (very) brief description of the meanings 
of “flexicurity” in Denmark and in the Netherlands, we can ask: are they 
comparable, and with respect to which properties (1991b:245-246)? What is 
obvious is that, from the limited information compared, both employment regimes 
stand widely apart. Compared to the Danish, the Dutch is heavily gender-biased: 
whereas a system of interactions (the “triangle”) seems to apply rather universally 
in Denmark, the “flexicurity” impact mainly concerns women in the Netherlands24. 
If we single out three elements from this first empirical approach, table 1 displays 
considerable differences between the two countries, even when we leave aside long-
term implications of specific social compromises. Two common elements stand out: 
both countries have a mix of collective agreements and labour laws, but this mix – 
however deeply embedded in their respective forms of corporatism – is 
substantially different, which gives ambiguous outcomes as to whether labour law 
should be considered “flexible” evenly across both countries. 
 
Table 1. Comparing Denmark’s and the Netherlands’ “flexicurity”  
Flexicurity  Denmark The Netherlands 
Gender dimension Universalistic Gendered
Social embeddedness corporatist corporatist
Labour law and collec-
tive agreements 
Mixed, combining high 
protection from collective 
dismissals with corporat-
ism
Mixed, combining high 
protection for open-ended 
contracts with corporat-
ism
 
Hence, that leaves open the question as to whether “flexicurity” is a “cat-dog” or 
a real dog. To a certain extent, it can act as a concept inductively drawn from empir-
ical facts collected in Denmark and the Netherlands. But if one takes the gender 
dimension as essential, then clearly the same notion cannot adequately describe 
both countries. Incidentally, the fact that the same word is used in them has strictly 
nothing to do with any form of Europeanization, bar the travelling of the word. 
What was initially seen as specific to Denmark (see our Danish quotation) was 
_____________ 
 
and called the Danish model ”flexicurity”. It is good because in French they say “flexicu-
rité” – our translation]. 
24 It is not surprising that “combination security” (“the security of a worker of being able 
to combine his or her job with other – notably private – responsibilities and commitments 
than paid work” – one of the dimensions identified as part of the “flexicurity matrix”) 
(Wilthagen and Tros 2003: 6) was first particularly stressed in the Dutch context, with its 
gender-biased feature. 
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finally grafted into a word adopted from the Netherlands. It is now necessary to go 
beyond this observation and try and see whether a more generalized sociological 
approach is possible to understand “flexicurity” independently of its historical roots 
in Denmark and the Netherlands. 
 
The adventures of “flexicurity” at the EU-level: an opportune adoption 
 
The comprehensive story of the idea of “flexicurity” at the EU-level remains to 
be written: one will have to take into account the role of many actors in many 
countries (Barbier 2014). Suffice it to say, at this stage, that the European 
Commission, in 2005-2006, was still relatively new and that social policies at the 
EU level had just been profoundly revised. In the late 1990’s, the open methods of 
coordination (OMCs) that the Commission introduced were seen as part of a 
political exchange, as the political construction of what was presented as a ‘balance 
between the economic and the social’. However, these days were long past and 
since 2004, with the integration of 12 new members, the failed referendums in the 
Netherlands, France and Ireland, what was left of ‘Social Europe’ was certainly no 
motive for officials to become sanguine. The Commission was extremely keen on 
finding a new field of action and it invested “flexicurity” as such, with the active 
help of Danish and Dutch politicians and scholars. Freed from its Dutch origin, the 
definition of “flexicurity” as a “strategy” thus seemed to have won the day in 
various international publications (European Commission 2006b: 77). 
However, it should not be forgotten that, when the word “flexicurity” was not 
yet used, the joint reference to flexibility and to security had been present for a long 
time in the various prescriptive frameworks produced by EU institutions since the 
Delors White Paper adopted by the European Council in 1993. Vague references 
were already present in the 1994 Essen priorities and the normative necessity of a 
“balance” between flexibility and security appeared in the first Amsterdam 
European Employment Strategy guidelines in Autumn 1997. But suddenly, 
“flexicurity” featured higher and higher on the Commission’s agenda, at the end of 
2006: a symptom of the new interest was to be found in the addition of a special 
item to the Eurobarometer survey. The way it was done, we think, shed an 
interesting light upon EU-level politics. In its Eurobarometer October 2006 survey 
(:14-15), the Commission inserted a section labelled “Europeans’ approval of the 
concept of flexicurity” and concluded it by saying that “a large majority of citizens 
agree with all the proposals and thus indirectly agree with the concept of 
‘flexicurity’ (between 72% and 88%)”. The proposals interviewees were deemed to 
agree with were presented them one by one, yet within the frame of a single 
question25. To say the least, the interpretation along which the survey demonstrated 
_____________ 
 
25 These were: « regular training improves one’s job opportunities »; « life time 
jobs with the same employer are a thing of the past »; « Being able to change easily 
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an “indirect” support for “flexicurity” is extremely difficult indeed to accept from a 
sociological point of view. However, when seen from the point of view of politics, 
this statement appears as a classical exercise of “political communication”. After 
the double failure of the referendums in France and the Netherlands over the project 
for a constitutional treaty in 2005, the Commission decided to step up its 
communication policy. The Spring summit conclusions are worth quoting at some 
length: “Last but not least, with only a few exceptions, public ownership26 of the 
Lisbon growth and jobs strategy falls short. Media coverage has also been fairly 
limited. We cannot yet say, therefore, that broad sections of the population have 
been made aware, let alone taken ownership, of the strategy. Thispoints to the need 
for a dedicated communication strategy, making full use of economic analysis and 
showing how action will bring real benefits for individual citizens. Similarly, social 
partners, who have an important role to play both as participants in the process 
and as message multipliers, should become more actively involved in the 
governance process.” (European Commission 2006a:7). In other words, the 
Commission attributed European citizens’ indifference or hostility to the Lisbon 
strategy to their insufficient information. Implicitly, this argument, at least as a 
partial one, was also used to account for the failure of the referendums in the 
Netherlands and in France in 2005. It was all the more important for the 
Commission to come forward with a new, positive message, in the absence of any 
new social policies at the EU level (Barbier 2008a): “flexicurity” was to play this 
role, because it brought with it the promise of reconciling the basic contradictions 
of capitalist systems in Europe, a “wish-list” as van den Berg has justly remarked 
(2009). Additionally, the linguistic innovation, (i.e. adopting the word “flexicurity)”, 
it must be noted, did not occur by chance and at any moment. It was supported by 
governments from countries like Denmark (happy to “sell” their “model” abroad) 
and, less obviously, the Netherlands, all active in what can be seen as a “war 
between social models” at the EU level between Member States. It happened at a 
moment when the Commission – destabilised by the consequences of the Dutch and 
French referendums – has been trying with much difficulty to counter its decrease 
of power and (especially for the actors in the DG social affairs within the 
Commission) to fight against the relative depreciation of the OMC processes in the 
social domain. In other countries, similar terms were adopted, but not without 
_____________ 
 
from one job to another is a useful asset to help people find a job nowadays »; 
« Work contracts should become more flexible to encourage job creation »; « In 
[OUR COUNTRY] many people retire too early » (QC 18: please tell me, for each 
of the following statements to what extent you agree or disagree with it). 
26 It is also at the same date that the reference to “ownership” (appropriation, in French, 
Identifizerung, in German) started to feature systematically in the Commission’s documents. 
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controversies, which were, as the French case clearly demonstrated, a symptom that 
there was no such thing as a “substantive common agenda” of flexicurity27. 
As a result, within the European Commission, the term “flexicurity” without 
other specification was widely circulated. It also became a catchword in academia 
and in international political and expert circles, but also at national level for 
specialists, in a similar manner as “activation” did. At this stage, no particular link – 
other than very remote, was maintained with the original situation of countries 
where the term was coined. What was already, at its origins, a vaguely designed 
political notion became a combination of many dimensions that had only in 
common the fact that they could please member states and their social partners in 
one way or another: flexibility for employers, standardization of non-standard 
employment contracts, formalisation of informal sector employment, access to 
learning and good job transitions for all, support for the unemployed in finding their 
way to high-quality jobs, etc. (van den Berg, 2009: 7). The Commission was keen 
to “depoliticize” an issue that, in the Netherlands and in Denmark, (where the 
expression took its meaning and its social validity), was always directly and 
essentially politicized (parties and social partners being crucial participants in the 
compromises leading to any form of “flexicurity”)28.  The very special balance 
Danes had achieved, obviously, over a long period of their history (perhaps since 
their “September Compromise” of 1899), has social roots in their particular 
coherence of institutions, values and adaptive ability to economic changes. In any 
country, in France and the Netherlands for that matter, the balance between what is 
acceptable and desirable in terms of flexibility of labour and employment on one 
side, and what is seen as “necessary” (normally expected) security on the other, 
very much depends on social coherences (political cultures) built over years within 
polities: such preferences are obviously reinforced by institutions and their success 
in the regulation of societies. Hence, “flexicurity”, in principle, should de facto be 
seen as a primarily national question.  
 
Trying to give “flexicurity” sociological sense 
 
Just as we saw for the expression “activation”, the dissemination of a word 
within transnational political arenas and forums does not prevent ascribing it sound 
and robust signification; yet for this, one needs the help of analysis and concept 
_____________ 
 
27 For the struggle about definitions and the choice of words in France (flexisécurité 
against flexicurité, etc.., see Barbier et al. (2009). 
28 Inter alia, the gap between the apparently de-politicized framing and wording of the 
“flexicurity” question found in EU documents appears very clearly when one compares 
them with the substance of debates held in the European Parliament specialised 
commissions.  For instance, the Greek representative of the GUE/NGL group (which groups, 
inter alia, communist MEPs) thought that “flexicurity” was akin to “flexploitation”. 
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formation, a process that was never achieved eventually in the case of “flexicurity”. 
When all the sophisticated exercises of “benchmarking” were made with the help of 
indicators used by the Commission, combining a Principal Components Analysis 
(PCA) with a clustering of countries (2006b: 75-118)29, and, remarkably,  omitting 
“social dialogue” as an indicator, this exercise left the question of the definition of 
“flexicurity” completely unsolved. True, countries were “clustered” with reference 
to the indicators chosen, but no one ever knew what “flexicurity” really was, except 
in terms of the vague political promise to reconcile contradictions between 
employers’ and employees’ expectations, powers and interests. We nevertheless 
tried sociological analysis to help sorting out possible rigorous definitions (table 2). 
In this table 30  we tried to map out some definitions that could be used for a 
sociological concept of “flexicurity”: the area of sociology and social science is in 
grey in the table, whereas the area occupied by politics and policy consultancy, or 
normative analysis (as in economics) was left in white. 
What we arrived at is rather simple (our findings are more extensively presented 
elsewhere, Barbier, 2007b). Reviewing usages of the term leads to distinguishing 
two main possible sociological definitions, which are not exclusive from one 
another: (a) “flexicurity” can be a policy/strategy and (b) “flexicurity” can be a 
system of components. In the first case, the policy explicitly states that it pursues 
the goal of reconciling flexibility on the one hand, and security on the other. In the 
second, it is a system31 embedded in a given society, that is designed for provoking 
the reconciling of flexibility and security (implicitly or explicitly, for certain actors). 
Sociological policy analysis distinguishes between ideational dimensions of policies, 
as opposed to their material elements (roughly: there exist (a1) political discourses 
and (a2) programmes and actors). Discourses can take many aspects: while they 
convey cognitive messages, they are also instrumental (conflicts of power), 
normative and sometimes manipulative (in the case of political communication). 
For instance, discussing in the European Parliament actors oppose one another 
about the sheer possibility of “flexicurity”’s existence: some see it as a chimera, 
_____________ 
 
29 They mainly used four indicators: the ‘strictness of employment protection legislation’; 
expenditure on labour market policies; the share of participants in life-long programmes and 
the average tax-wedge, and their analysis ends up in a grouping of countries into “five 
flexicurity/labour market systems” (European Commission 2006b: 102-109) 
30 In the table, we distinguish between research tasks and other activities directly linked 
to politics. Social science research figures on the upper left of the table (analytical-positive 
goals) while normative activities appear on the right side; some activities are in-between 
(analytical and normative: this is the case of benchmarking but, more broadly, of many 
economic studies.) 
31 Actually, a sub-system centred on the labour market (Barbier 2007a). Wilthagen and 
Tros (2003: 5) also write: “flexicurity could not merely be seen as a species of labour 
market policy/strategy but also a certain “state” or condition of the labour market”. 
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some as an interesting strategy or a plausible theory of action for a programme. Of 
course many interrogations arise as to what “components” of flexibility and security 
should be considered. It is also essential to recall that the notion came to be 
discussed in a definite context, i.e., the present flexibilization of markets, a trend 
driven by globalisation. The ultimate basic rationale for flexibility lies indeed in the 
contemporary transformation of international monetary norms and in labour costs 
competition; as empirical data amply demonstrated in Europe, the gradual 
flexibilization of jobs has entailed the degradation of conditions of work and 
protection for a significant part of the population, especially those with lower 
qualifications. It is then highly improbable that, against this common and powerful 
economic background, institutional arrangements would be easily built to marry 
flexibility and security, unless equally strong social conditions for negotiations, 
compromises and the redistribution of resources were met. The economic constraint 
is one of labour flexibility – labour as a factor of production, for reasons of cost 
competition – which can be disconnected from employment flexibility (Barbier and 
Nadel 2000). Post-2008 developments of the economic crisis of the EU have amply 
confirmed and even worsened this constraint. Of course, once a definite list of 
components of a “system of flexicurity” are identified (and possibly, some 
interactions), the essential task remains, i.e. objectifying and explaining their 
aggregate functioning, as a complex web of interactions, complementarities, etc.. 
between various sub-systems within a particular society. For instance, in one 
country, it is possible that “flexicurity policies” were implemented, and that they 
failed, whereas in another country, a “flexicurity policy” was implemented and 
contributed to making its twin objectives compatible, also because the history of the 
country and its institutions allowed for doing the right choices at the right moment. 
Both political discourses and the implementation of specific programmes participate 
in the achievement of the goal of “flexicurity” as a system. 
Some of the implications of the distinction (strategy versus system) will be 
clearer if we contrast the French and the Danish situations in the years 2005-2006. 
France is a country characterised by a high level of union fragmentation and a low 
union density, where a relatively high level of social conflict accompanies the 
implementation of reforms, with high uncertainty about eventual outcomes. In this 
country, labour law overwhelmingly prevails over collective agreements. Often, as 
was the case in 2005-2006, with Prime Minister de Villepin, the government tries 
and passes Bills in Parliament to reform either social protection or labour law, 
without really consulting with social partners or unions. This often leads to reforms 
being controversial and provides legitimate motives for open street demonstrations, 
a quite common habit in this country32. In 2005-2006, the government was proud of 
_____________ 
 
32 During the 90s, apart from a period of intense demonstrations triggered by Prime 
minister Balladur’s attitude in 1994 over a government proposal to create a special contract 
with a lower minimum wage for the young, two main significant social movements took 
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his success in introducing a new employment contract (contrat nouvelle embauche, 
August 2005) with shorter notice periods, for firms with less than 20 staff, and it 
thought the introduction of an additional one of a similar type for the young was 
going to be easy in early 2006. Very typically, the de Villepin government always 
claimed that this was a policy initiative due to its learning from Denmark (Barbier 
2007a). But the reform for the new contract for the young was eventually defeated 
in the streets. When presenting his “social testament”, de Villepin nevertheless 
concluded that, at all costs, France would have to find a “flexicurité à la 
française33”. The French case illustrates the fact that a strategy was attempted to 
introduce various reforms that might at first sight pass for a “flexicurity strategy”. 
Because of the failure of the government to really implement it, the French situation 
of the labour market remained for a great part unchanged (which led to the re-
negotiation of a national agreement later, in 2007-2008). By contrast, in Denmark, 
politicians and academics adopted the term “flexicurity” for policies that, in the first 
place, were not conceived of as “flexicurity” strategies, the term coming only later 
to Danish forums. These policies have amply shown that the present Danish 
situation fitted reasonably well in Wilthagen and Tros’s definition: moreover, 
Danish scholars tended to think that the elements of the “flexicurity” system in 
Denmark had roots in past history that was key to understanding today’s 
performances (Madsen 2006; Kristensen 2006). Last but not least, the elements 
which Danish scholars tended to associate with features of the Danish “flexicurity 
system” were hardly if at all heard of, or documented, in the French case: for 
instance, the French system of unemployment assistance and insurance was very 
ungenerous when compared to the Danish, and the system of active labour market 
programmes in France much less effective than the Danish. Moreover, the contrast 
was maybe at its highest for the support for reform in both countries and for the 
widely diverging systems of industrial relations, not to mention the basic rules of 
the French polity (Barbier, Colomb, Madsen 2009). 
_____________ 
 
place. The first one (winter 1995) was organised over pensions in the public sector and the 
healthcare insurance reform; the second (winter 1997-98), over the situation of the 
unemployed, was organised by NGOs supporting the unemployed. A fourth moment was the 
reform of the unemployment insurance. Although it did not spark off demonstrations in any 
way comparable to the 1994, 1995 and 1997 waves, it did indeed provoke very active and 
fierce debate. On a smaller scale, recurrent debate and strikes supported by the unions have 
also accompanied the series of the most significant (and media reported) waves of 
redundancies.  
33 Prime Minister’s speech at the Conseil économique et Social, February, 26, 2007 
where he told there were three main axes for this future “flexicurité à la française”: 
reforming labour law; reforming vocational training, and reforming the Public employment 
service. 
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To sum up our findings so far, it has unfortunately remained impossible to find a 
common base for studying the interaction of standardized elements in many 
countries for a concept of “flexicurity” to be defined rigourously. By induction, 
superficial similarities between the recent histories in the Netherlands and in 
Denmark can be observed. However the literature never went further. The story, 
nevertheless, cannot be concluded like that: more research is perhaps needed. Even 
in the case where we would make the assumption that a similar, if not “common” 
system of interactions existed in the two countries, we would still be left anyhow 
with the task of explaining the functioning of these “complementarities”. What to 
do of the features deeply embedded in Danish society, among the explanatory 
causes or variables for accounting for the present success, as Madsen (2006) and 
Kristensen (2006) suggest? Seen in this light, the “Danish flexicurity” system is a 
complex web of interactions, of collective action and of individual adaptation to 
societal norms and rules, which is in a way unique. Hence, one is bound to analyse 
a “flexibility outcome” (or “degree” or performance level) as the “product” of a 
system, a societal combination of sub-systems, placed in their historical 
development and path-dependence, with a considerable interplay of factors. Here, 
Amable’s (2003) approach to “institutional complementarities” is useful. In 
sociology, establishing genuine causal links between present policies and a holistic 
“outcome” or “state” that characterizes a particular society has always been tricky34. 
It seems quite logical however to try and find bases for theorizing “flexicurity” 
among disciplinary approaches that pay central attention to corporatism and to the 
role played by social compromises. In the political science and sociological 
tradition, as well as in institutional economics, approaches which immediately come 
to the mind centre on the question of ‘regulation’ of society (in the sense of 
régulation in French and Regelung in German). In this perspective, apart from 
Mayntz and Scharpf’s “actor-centred institutionalism” we also find very useful 
support in Jobert’s approach (1998) and Boyer’s (1986). From a Jobertian 
perspective, the question of “flexicurity” boils down to the organisation of power 
relations between actors which are constructed into a “political order” and 
“flexicurity” is a political référentiel (cognitive frame) that can be used by certain 
actors to change the existing social relationships. The French “regulation” school, 
with Boyer, has emphasised the key role played by “institutionalised compromises”, 
which emerge from social conflicts and political processes (Boyer 2006).  
Finally, if “flexicurity” ever deserves to be constructed as a concept, it would 
have to find its place at some crossing-point in the wider ‘wage-labour nexus’ 
_____________ 
 
34 Hence the everlasting discussion about the degree of ‘causality’ which is present in 
Max Weber’s use of the term ‘affinities’, and which can be easily applied to the case of 
Denmark today (Barbier 2007a). 
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(rapport salarial)35, and in the social protection institutional area36: for “flexicurity” 
to become a significant feature of the wage-labour nexus, around the trade-offs, 
complementarities and vicious circles between the various forms of flexibility and 
security that various actors demand, accept or reject, compromises have to be 
institutionalized at national level. Hence, quite different from a technical toolbox, 
“flexicurity” is throughout of a political nature. Secondly, it is still necessary to 
analyse more closely the relevant complementarities that are (or were) able to 
creating the conditions under which potential “flexicurity” institutional 
compromises could be struck in the future (or have already been). Let’s risk the 
final assumption here that, by introducing political “regulation” (in the French sense 
of régulation), power relationships and industrial relations systems, one would 
probably end up with the finding that, if it has any distinctive substantial content, 
“flexicurity” may only fit within certain types of capitalism. Whatever their 
important differences, both empirical examples studied would certainly confirm the 
existence of a negotiated national compromise supported by the majority of the 
population, leading to a substantive balance of security and flexibility among 
individual members of the workforce (and across households) (Barbier 2007a for 
Denmark), at least over a defined number of years. By contrast, the French situation 
cannot really be seen as having yielded any new compromise (at the time of 
writing), when fragmentation (social protection and labour market) and inequality 
increased, even after the important signing of a national collective agreement in 
early 2008. In this sense, the invention of a “flexicurity system” had still to emerge 
in this country, before the financial crisis occurred and transformed the landscape 
totally. This empirical finding could be easily replicated in many other European 
countries, and the UK is probably a case in point. Incidentally it is also important to 
again stress that such arrangements were transitory. With different economic 
circumstances, and different political compromises and actors, a “Danish 
_____________ 
 
35 In this “institutional area” (or institutional form – for Boyer), Amable (2003: 124-142), 
uses three indicators: employment protection; industrial relations; employment policy. In the 
“social-democratic” model, Amable notes that “strong external competitive pressure 
requires some flexibility of the workforce. But flexibility is not simply achieved through 
lay-offs and market adjustments; retraining of a highly-skilled workforce plays a crucial role 
in the adaptability of workers. Protection of specific investments of employees is realized 
through a mixture of moderate employment protection, a high level of social protection, and 
easy access to retraining thanks to active labour market policies. A coordinated wage-
bargaining system enables solidaristic wage-setting which favours innovation and 
productivity. A centralized financial system enables firms to develop long-term strategies” 
(id.: 105-107). In Amable’s typology, the Netherlands belong to the continental European 
type. 
36 In this “institutional area”, Amable (2003: 149-160) uses a number of indicators relat-
ed to the structure of social protection. 
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flexicurity” system or a Dutch one were thoroughly altered (Jørgensen 2012) : in 
Denmark unemployment benefit eligibility was cut by two years in 2010, prompting 
the union LO to ask for more “employment protection”. More generally, as an item 
on the European Commission’s agenda, “flexicurity” quietly receded to a remote 
place as macroeconomic and financial coordination took over (Barbier 2013). 
 
 
Table 2. Social science research about ‘flexicurity’: mapping tasks and ap-
proaches of concepts 
Tasks Tasks Social science (analyti-
cal-positive) 
Analytical and 
normative: in-
between activities 
(economics) 
Normative 
activities 
Describing Describing 
“flexicurity”=> 
its components 
and the ‘system’ 
they make 
 
-Elements 
-System of 
interactions 
(institutions, 
rules) 
 
Identifying 
a – policies (and strate-
gies) 
1) discourses (cogni-
tive/normative) 
2) actors and their 
strategies, programmes 
implemented 
b – phenomena, institu-
tions and arrangements: 
elements that are candi-
dates for featuring within 
an analytical (universal) 
stylised framework/ 
system of “flexicurity” 
-  interactions between 
elements 
 Political 
discourse 
about 
elements of 
flexicurity 
 
Articulated 
by actors 
participating 
in the 
promo-
tion/demotio
n of flexicu-
rity as a 
political 
strategy 
(politicians, 
experts, 
academics, 
etc) 
Explaining 
And  under-
standing  
Causal attribu-
tion/ ‘affinities’) 
of ef-
fects/situations, 
etc.. 
to the impact of  
 
the elements/the 
system of 
“flexicurity” 
- Explaining actors’ 
strategies 
- Attributing changes 
(dependent variables) in 
certain phenomena to 
public activi-
ties/strategies/institutions 
and the system they build 
with actors’ responses, 
strategies 
- Assessing potential 
effects of ideas 
Evaluation studies and 
benchmarking: 
mainstream econom-
ics/correlations, etc. , 
econometrics 
Political 
discourse 
about the 
goals of 
flexicurity 
 
(idem) 
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Valu-
ing/assessing 
 
Recommenda-
tions for  
policy makers 
 
 Economic studies, 
modelizing strategies, 
based on stylised facts, 
leading to one or more 
‘better strategies’ => 
‘policy lessons’ 
 
Political 
communica-
tion as 
legitima-
tion/de-
legitimation 
discourses 
for strategies 
 
 
Flexicurity and Europeanization 
 
At first sight, “flexicurity” would appear as an ideal candidate concept for 
capturing the traces of Europeanization in the various member states of the EU. The 
concept was systematically promoted by the European Commission during more 
than 2 years: all states had to report to the Commission about their 
“implementation” of “flexicurity pathways” that were proposed to them. Any 
meeting organized by the DG Employment Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities 
at the time was explicitly framed as part of “flexicurity”: European social partners 
negotiated the adoption of a common declaration about it37. A mainstream discourse 
was powerfully promoted by the Commission, with the support of Dutch and 
Danish actors, academics and politicians. The discourse travelled even in countries 
which, at first sight, were deemed to be hostile to it: that is probably the main 
achievement of Europeanization. In countries as different as France and Denmark, 
with very differing industrial relations systems, actors seized upon the de-
contextualized discourse, to use it as a resource for bargaining (Barbier, Colomb 
and Madsen 2009). Sometimes, negotiation was made easier, sometimes, as in 
Denmark typically, a rather national strong coalition formed itself (at least for a 
time), to fight for retaining the Danish style of governance of the labour market 
(Jørgensen 2013). Nevertheless, the substance of the Danish style was not more 
affected for that matter than the French style. Europeanization did not extend to the 
substance and content of arrangements, still very different after the adoption of a 
common English word. A surface discourse Europeanization has been the main 
outcome observable in the area of labour market and social protection reform. 
Moreover, beyond the now fading away fad, the economic crisis taught that tough 
structural reform was imposed upon countries, without even mentioning 
“flexicurity” at all. 
 
 
_____________ 
 
37 The ETUC nevertheless significantly refused to endorse the document at the end of 
2006, although it accepted that a common “taking stock” exercise was conducted with 
Business Europe, the employers’ organisation. 
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4. Conclusion: surface and hard Europeanizations 
 
The exercise we practiced here is based on the long-term collection of empirical 
findings in many countries of Europe, including the UK, Denmark, Germany, Italy, 
the Netherlands and others (Barbier 2006; 2008a). This collection was essentially 
completed before the financial crisis broke out in 2008. For lack of space, we have 
only quoted some of it. Each time with the help of empirical surveys, mostly 
qualitative and sometimes ethnographic, but also with the crucial help of informers 
in the countries visited, we have gathered an important bank of comparative data, 
that, as often as possible, included the effort to understand how political notions – 
initially crafted in European English – were used by local actors in their own 
language. At the end of the day, what we arrived at is a bifurcated conclusion on 
both the objects of our research, the “activation of social protection” on the one 
hand, and “flexicurity” on the other. Both notions have travelled across the member 
states of the European Union, and even further, for instance in Japan and Mexico. 
What has travelled was, in each case, a notion, a concept of a very abstract nature. 
Undeniably, this dissemination is an outcome of Europeanization (namely: the way 
of talking about the labour market and social protection became more homogenized, 
a hybridized discourse was created and cognitive coordination was achieved). But, 
mostly such Europeanization was found to remain vague and superficial; moreover, 
it was very much dependent upon economic circumstances. As the empirics of the 
present paper were collected before the economic crisis, it is interesting, with 
hindsight to put the findings in perspective from a 2014 point of view. 
In the case of “activation”, the essential meaning conveyed was that of the 
normative acceptation to impose obligations upon the unemployed, for the sake of 
morality, fairness and efficiency. Political discourses were sometimes tougher or 
more generous, but the tune of the day was in favour of “rights and obligations”. 
The Europeanization of the discourse is here evident, but it always remained at a 
superficial level, because substantive rights and substantive obligations kept on 
differing extremely from one country to the other, even after reform (see the cases 
of Denmark and the United Kingdom as a typical opposition, even in 2013 – see 
Jørgensen H., 2013) . What was also remarkable was that politicians did only 
change their discourse of “rights and responsibilities” briefly in the immediate 
aftermath of the 2008 crisis (especially in France and Germany). They were quickly 
back to the moralizing and often punitive discourse for one main reason: this 
“narrative” was consistent with the underlying drive towards the containment of 
costs of assistance and unemployment compensation (Barbier 2009). This fitted 
well into the new order of the day, marked by structural reforms the European 
Commission, and the fiscal coordinators asked for, especially in Greece, Ireland and 
Portugal. 
“Flexicurity”, on the other hand, eventually appeared as a “wish list” of things 
desirable and desired by social partners and politicians, especially in “Brussels” 
under the first Barroso Commission. The discourse, here again, was certainly 
Europeanized, providing but another example of the constant “cognitive” 
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Europeanization of the national discourses translated in European English. However, 
the umbrella (or portmanteau) term was used to cover so many different situations 
that it almost lost any distinctive substance: when real decisions were to be made, 
they had to be made in national forums and arenas, and, there, the ambiguity of 
compromises between right and left parties and social partners led to tough 
bargaining where “flexicurity” was only a distant reference, when it was used at all 
at that stage38. Using sociological analysis, we proposed the analytical concept of 
“activation of social protection” as a broad marker of a general trend that we had 
identified in almost every country we explored, although with very different 
degrees and very differing types of reform programmes. The sociological concept 
we proposed was very different from the mainstream political catchword. We were 
able to identify some form of Europeanization in the dissemination of general ideas, 
along which it is agreed that systems had to be reformed in the sense of making 
them more employment-friendly. The rationale, by the way, extended beyond 
Europe in the USA and Canada, for instance, albeit marginally. When we tried and 
conceptualize the notion of “flexicurity” with the help of sociology, what we found 
was that it could mean a category of policies and programmes, but we found there 
was no particular interest to name them “flexicurity policies”, because there was 
practically no analytical way to strictly distinguish them from other policies. Once 
the aim of these was to solve the many contradictions of European capitalisms, 
almost anything could pass as “flexicurity” policy. Secondly, we observed that 
sophisticated research was still necessary to identify the precise complementarities 
that would be able to explain the positive outcomes observed in the early 1990s in 
Denmark and the Netherlands. Here, “flexicurity” could have been a system, before 
the crisis, over a period of 10 to 20 years, and it displayed the traces of a virtuous 
association of complementarities. That did not mean however, that a clear, 
distinctive notion of “flexicurity” as a system, as an achieved state of things, could 
be applied to both. That certainly did not mean either, that Danish and Dutch 
experiences could be seen as a source of “best practice” that could be transported to 
other countries. After the crisis broke out, this picture was to be thoroughly 
transformed and “flexicurity” quickly disappeared from the core agenda. 
Finally, the picture painted here is one that combines the construction of a 
general Europeanized ideology, a common discourse mainly practiced by political 
elites, but in which academic elites actively participate in the construction.  The 
“activation of social protection” and “flexicurity” evidently fit well in the current 
list of common ideas typical of an era of “neo-liberal governance”. However, as 
Campbell and Pedersen (2001) showed in their in-depth comparison of the 
“domestication” of neo-liberal doctrines in many countries, the eventual outcome 
and influence of these “common ideas” finally fail to produce a common European, 
_____________ 
 
38 It was certainly no more used at the stage of negotiation in France for instance in the 
crucial 2008 round (see Barbier et al. 2009). 
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substantive new model of labour market and social protection. Such conclusions are 
only observable if we actively try to escape the pitfalls of misclassification, 
degreeism, parochialism, and concept stretching (Sartori 1991), pitfalls that we 
hope to have escaped in the present paper.  
The management of the crisis by European elites – national and federal alike – 
also taught the general public that the main force in action for the Europeanization 
of labour market policies was to be found in macroeconomic and financial 
agreements from 2008. “Activation” remained on a social agenda that was in any 
case marginalized and brutally submitted to adjustment policies, especially in 
Greece, Ireland and Portugal, but also in Spain, and less rigorously in France and 
Italy. “Flexicurity”, on the other hand was just a token citation of the past. “Hard” 
Europeanization went as far as violating international labour law (Schömann and 
Clauwert 2012). 
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